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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Appellant Shawn Shaw, a former corrections officer, 
was convicted by a jury of sexually assaulting a female 
inmate in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242 and obstruction of 
justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3).  We will 
affirm.   
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I 
 
 In December 2010, E.S.1 was a pretrial detainee 
incarcerated at the Essex County Correctional Facility 
(“ECCF” or “jail”) in Newark, New Jersey.  Shaw was a 
correctional officer employed at ECCF.  Although Shaw had 
worked at the jail for five years, he had worked in the 
women’s unit only a handful of times.  On December 27 and 
28, 2010, Shaw was asked to cover the women’s unit alone 
during the overnight shift from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. 
because the jail was short-staffed due to a snow storm. 
 
 When Shaw arrived for his shift, some of the women 
including E.S. “flashed” him with their buttocks as “sort of a 
hazing ritual to the new officer in the unit.”  App. 326.  Shaw 
responded by making sexual comments to E.S., such as 
asking if he can “hit that,” which E.S. understood to be a 
request to perform sexual acts.  App. 327.  Shaw also spoke 
over an intercom connected to the cell that E.S. shared with a 
cellmate, made explicit sexual advances, and threatened that 
he was “going to come in there” and “get [her] out of there.”  
App. 329.  
 
 Shortly before 3:00 a.m. on December 28, 2010, E.S. 
awoke to Shaw in her cell.2   Shaw removed E.S.’s pants, 
“forced himself on [her],” App. 332, by “[p]ressing down” his 
hand on her chest so that she was unable to get up, and 
digitally penetrated her vagina, App. 404.  Shaw then 
removed his own pants and underwear and laid on top of E.S. 
                                              
 1  The victim is herein identified only by her initials.  
 2  E.S.’s cellmate testified that she remained asleep. 
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with the weight of his body.  Shaw proceeded to engage in 
sexual intercourse with E.S. who was unable to move and 
“felt like [she] couldn’t breathe.”  App. 404.3  
 
 E.S. did not immediately report the incident, but told a 
male inmate (via hand signals), her mother and her attorney.  
The male inmate reported the incident to the jail.  When 
confronted, E.S. formally reported the sexual assault.  She 
was examined by a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner, and was 
found to have semen on her cervix.  The Government later 
extracted a DNA mixture.  An expert for the Government 
testified at trial that it was “approximately 28.9 million times 
more likely in the African American population” that E.S. and 
Shaw were the sources of the mixture, than if E.S. and a 
“randomly selected unrelated individual” were the sources.  
App. 610.  Shaw is African American.  
 
 The Government also introduced electronic records of 
the cell doors at ECCF.  The records established that E.S.’s 
cell door was opened on the night of the incident at 2:43:41 
a.m. and closed at 2:50:39 a.m.  The computer that opened the 
door was “TS 04” and Shaw was logged into TS 04 at that 
time.  No one else logged into TS 04 during Shaw’s overnight 
shift. 
 
 Jail investigators also retrieved surveillance videos.  
Although there was no video of either E.S.’s cell or the TS 04 
work station, the videos did show Shaw going on break and 
returning to the women’s unit slightly before the sexual 
                                              
 3  At trial, E.S. testified that she is five feet, five inches 
tall and one hundred and thirty pounds; she estimated that 
Shaw is over six feet tall and far heavier than she. 
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assault.  The surveillance videos refuted Shaw’s intimation to 
investigators that he was on break during the incident. 
 
 There was, however, a complication in interpreting the 
video evidence: the surveillance camera clocks were not 
synchronized with one another or with the clock associated 
with the cell door records.  To synchronize the time stamps ex 
post, an ECCF maintenance information technician, Delfin 
Neves, used “arithmetic.”  App. 153.  Neves calculated the 
“difference” between each surveillance camera clock and the 
clock for the facility systems.  App. 152.4  He recorded the 
results in a chart listing the “drift” for each surveillance 
camera clock.  App. 131.5 
 
 Using Neves’ chart, an ECCF investigator, Maria 
Theodoridis, adjusted the time stamps on the videos showing 
Shaw leaving and returning from break.  After her 
corrections, the video evidence showed that Shaw left for 
                                              
 4  The facilities systems clock is accurate because 
Neves calibrates it twice a week.   
 
 5  Neves made his calculations a few days after the 
incident, and so his chart approximated the drift on the night 
of the incident.  One surveillance camera clock was four 
minutes and forty seconds ahead of the facilities systems 
clock; another was five minutes and thirteen seconds behind.  
In short, even though the surveillance cameras were recording 
simultaneously, they showed a nine minute and fifty-three 
second difference in time. 
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break at 2:31:06 a.m. and returned at 2:37:46 a.m.—a few 
minutes before E.S.’s cell door was opened at 2:43:41 a.m.6 
 
 On December 31, 2010, Shaw gave a statement to 
investigators at the Essex County prosecutor’s office.  Shaw 
denied making sexual advances to E.S., repeatedly and 
emphatically denied opening her cell door, and repeatedly 
denied even entering her cell.  Shaw told the investigators that 
he left the women’s unit on his break “at like two thirty, two 
forty” for “about twenty minutes” and returned “maybe 
something about . . . three o’clock.”  SA 5. 
 
 At trial, Shaw testified consistent with his prior 
statement.  He denied making sexual comments to E.S., 
denied opening E.S.’s cell door, and denied having sexual 
intercourse with E.S.  Shaw testified that he was on break 
“[n]o more than 20 minutes,” but also agreed that it was more 
accurate to say that he was “only gone six or seven minutes.”  
App. 764.  Shaw also testified that male and female inmates 
were known to be engaging in sexual intercourse in the ECCF 
gym. 
 
 The jury convicted Shaw of deprivation of civil rights 
through aggravated sexual abuse, 18 U.S.C. § 242, and 
obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3).7  The District 
                                              
 6 If the time stamps had not been corrected, the videos 
would have shown Shaw returning from break at 2:42:49, a 
minute before E.S.’s cell door opened at 2:43:41 a.m. 
 
 7  The jury, however, found that the deprivation of 
civil rights did not result in bodily injury.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 242. 
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Court sentenced Shaw to 25 years’ incarceration and 5 years’ 
supervised release.  This represented a downward variance 
from the Sentencing Guideline range of life.  This timely 
appeal followed.8 
 
II 
 
 We begin by addressing Shaw’s claims related to his 
conviction for deprivation of civil rights by aggravated sexual 
abuse, 18 U.S.C. § 242.  Shaw challenges (1) the District 
Court’s jury instructions and (2) the sufficiency of the 
evidence.  We will describe the statute and then address each 
claim in turn. 
 
A 
 
1 
 
 A deprivation of civil rights under Section 242 of Title 
18 occurs where a defendant “under color of any law, statute, 
ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any 
person . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws 
of the United States.”  18 U.S.C. § 242.  This is a 
Reconstruction Era civil rights law.  United States v. Lanier, 
520 U.S. 259, 264 & n.1 (1997).  “Section 242 makes it a 
crime for a state official to act ‘willfully’ and under color of 
                                                                                                     
 
 8  The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 
18 U.S.C. § 3742. 
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law to deprive a person of rights protected by the 
Constitution.”  Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002); see 
also Lanier, 520 U.S. at 264.  The statute is “unusual for its 
application in so many varied circumstances.”  Koon v. 
United States, 518 U.S. 81, 101 (1996).  Among these, 
“[t]here are a multitude of cases in which prison 
administrators have been prosecuted under [Section 242].”  
United States v. Guadalupe, 402 F.3d 409, 414 (3d Cir. 
2005). 
 
 As is relevant here, Section 242 sets forth three 
statutory maximum sentences.  First, the default maximum 
sentence is “imprison[ment] not more than one year.”  
18 U.S.C. § 242.  Second, “if bodily injury results . . . or if 
such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 
a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire” the statutory 
maximum is “imprison[ment] not more than ten years.”  Id.  
Third, “if death results from the acts committed in violation 
of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt 
to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit 
aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill” the statutory 
maximum is life imprisonment or death.9  Id. (emphasis 
added); see also Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement 
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322 § 320103 (1994) (enacting, 
inter alia, increased statutory maximum sentence for 
aggravated sexual abuse or its attempt). 
 
                                              
 9  Cf. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008) 
(holding that the Eighth Amendment bars the death penalty 
for rape of a child where the crime did not result and was not 
intended to result in death). 
 
 9 
 
 
 In the case before us, the Government charged Shaw 
with both the base and aggravated violations of Section 242.  
As to the base offense, Shaw was charged with depriving E.S. 
of due process through unwanted sexual contact so egregious 
as to shock the conscience.  See Lanier, 520 U.S. at 261; 
United States v. Giordano, 442 F.3d 30, 47 (2d Cir. 2006).  
As to the aggravated offense, the Government charged Shaw 
with, inter alia, a violation of civil rights through “aggravated 
sexual abuse.”  App. 20.    
 
 Section 242, notably, does not define the term 
“aggravated sexual abuse.”  18 U.S.C. § 242.  While this 
Court has not yet addressed the issue, a number of our sister 
Circuits have defined the term by reference to the federal 
aggravated sexual abuse statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2241, excluding 
its jurisdictional requirements.  See Cates v. United States, 
882 F.3d 731, 736 (7th Cir. 2018); United States v. Lanham, 
617 F.3d 873, 888 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Holly, 488 
F.3d 1298, 1301 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Simmons, 
470 F.3d 1115, 1120 (5th Cir. 2006).  Likewise, the 
Government used this definition in its indictment of Shaw, 
and the parties agree on appeal that this was appropriate.  As 
such, we will employ this approach, defining aggravated 
sexual abuse for the purposes of Section 242 by reference to 
18 U.S.C. § 2241(a).   
 
2 
 
 Aggravated sexual abuse under Section 2241(a) 
“prohibits forced sexual acts against another person.”  
Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958, 964 n.1 (2016) 
(quotation marks omitted).  The statute is violated where the 
 10 
 
offender “knowingly causes another person to engage in a 
sexual act—(1) by using force against that other person; or 
(2) by threatening or placing that other person in fear that any 
person will be subjected to death, serious bodily injury, or 
kidnapping; or attempts to do so.”  18 U.S.C. § 2241(a).10   
 
 We read the aggravated sexual abuse statute, 
Section 2241(a), in contrast to the statute defining the lesser 
crime of (non-aggravated) sexual abuse, 18 U.S.C. § 2242(1).  
See, e.g., Cates, 882 F.3d at 736; United States v. H.B., 695 
F.3d 931, 936 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Crowley, 318 
F.3d 401, 406 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Lauck, 905 
F.2d 15, 18 (2d Cir. 1990).  Indeed, sexual abuse is defined 
by reference to aggravated sexual abuse—Section 2242(1) 
contains an explicit “carve-out” for threats encompassed by 
Section 2241(a)(2).  Cates, 882 F.3d at 736.  Sexual abuse 
occurs, in relevant part, where the defendant knowingly 
“causes another person to engage in a sexual act by 
                                              
 10  A “sexual act” includes, in relevant part, “the 
penetration, however slight, of the anal or genital opening of 
another by a hand or finger or by any object, with an intent to 
abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the 
sexual desire of any person” or “contact between the penis 
and the vulva.”  18 U.S.C. § 2246(2)(A), (C).  A “‘sexual act’ 
. . . require[s] penetration or actual skin-to-skin contact 
between various specified body parts.”  United States v. Dahl, 
833 F.3d 345, 355 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2246(2)(A)-(C)); see also id. (citing 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2246(2)(D)); United States v. Hayward, 359 F.3d 631, 641 
(3d Cir. 2004) (observing that “‘sexual act’ . . . requires skin-
to-skin touching”). 
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threatening or placing that other person in fear (other than by 
threatening or placing that other person in fear that any 
person will be subjected to death, serious bodily injury, or 
kidnapping).”  18 U.S.C. § 2242(1). 
 
 When read together, Sections 2241(a) and 2242(1) 
demonstrate Congress’s graded approach to criminalizing 
sexual assault.11  Aggravated sexual abuse requires the jury to 
“find that the defendant (1) actually used force against the 
victim or (2) that he made a specific kind of threat—i.e. that 
he threatened or placed the victim in fear of death, serious 
bodily injury, or kidnapping.”  Cates, 882 F.3d at 737 
(emphasis in original); see also H.B. 695 F.3d at 936.  In 
contrast, sexual abuse “encompasses the use of any [other] 
kind of threat or other fear-inducing coercion to overcome the 
victim’s will.”  Cates, 882 F.3d at 737.  “Threats or fear-
inducing coercion of a lesser nature can support a conviction 
                                              
 11  The legislative history further supports this reading 
of the text.  Sections 2241 and 2242 were enacted together as 
part of the Sexual Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-654, 
100 Stat. 3660 (1986).  The Act created “a series of graded 
sexual offenses” and employed a “graded approach” to 
criminalizing sexual assault.  Hearings on Sexual Abuse Act 
of 1986 before Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the 
House Committee of the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. at 3-
4 (Apr. 29, 1986) (statement of principal sponsor 
Representative Steny H. Hoyer); see also H. Rep. No. 594, 
99th Cong., 2d Sess. (May 9, 1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6186, 6190 (identifying Representative Hoyer 
as the principal sponsor). 
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for the crime of sexual abuse under § 2242(1) but not 
aggravated sexual abuse under § 2241(a)(2).”  Id. 
 
3 
 
 Other Circuits have further interpreted Section 
2241(a)(1) by reference to a House Judiciary Committee 
Report accompanying the Sexual Abuse Act of 1986.  See 
H.B., 695 F.3d at 936 (quoting H. Rep. No. 99-594 at 14 
n.54a); see also United States v. Johnson, 492 F.3d 254, 255 
(4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Fire Thunder, 908 F.2d 272, 
274 (8th Cir. 1990); Lauck, 905 F.2d at 17.   
 
 The House Report provides that for Section 2241(a), 
“[t]he requirement of force may be satisfied by a showing of 
[1] the use, or threatened use, of a weapon; [2] the use of such 
physical force as is sufficient to overcome, restrain, or injure 
a person; or [3] the use of a threat of harm sufficient to coerce 
or compel submission by the victim.”  H. Rep. No. 99-594 at 
14 n.54a (emphasis added).  There are two problems, 
however, with adopting this definition in its entirety.   
 
 First and notably, the House Report purports to define 
something specific—the “requirement of force” for Section 
2241(a).  Id.  Although this point has been overlooked, see, 
e.g., Johnson, 492 F.3d at 258, the House Report does not 
purport to define the element “using force against th[e] other 
person” under Section 2241(a)(1).  In fact, the House Report 
also purports to define the “requirement of force” for Section 
2242(1).  H. Rep. No. 99-594 at 16.  The latter statute, of 
course, does not contain the element “using force against 
th[e] other person.”  Therefore, the “requirement of force” 
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defined in the House Report cannot be the element “using 
force against th[e] other person” under Section 2241(a)(1). 
 
 The second problem relates to the statutory text.  The 
House Report defines the “requirement of force” for Section 
2241(a) in three ways.  The third is “the use of a threat of 
harm sufficient to coerce or compel submission by the 
victim.”  Id. at 14 n.54a.  But “defining ‘force’ in this 
expansive way . . . flatly contradict[s] the text of 
§ 2241(a)(1),” which requires actual force.  Cates, 882 F.3d at 
737; see also Br. for Appellee 24 (agreeing with “the 
unremarkable proposition that aggravated sexual assault 
‘requires a showing of actual force’”) (quoting H.B., 695 F.3d 
at 936 (interpreting Section 2241(a)(1))).  
 
 Moreover, it is not a solution to construe the House 
Report’s third definition as applying to Section 2241(a)(2) 
instead of Section 2241(a)(1).  On its face, Section 2241(a)(2) 
encompasses only certain threats—of “death, serious bodily 
injury, or kidnapping.”  18 U.S.C. § 2241(a)(2).  If adopted, 
the third portion of the House Report’s definition would 
collapse the distinction between Section 2241(a)(2) and 
Section 2242(1).   
 
 Indeed, the Government at no point defends the House 
Report’s third definition.  Instead, the Government asks us to 
adopt the second portion of the House Report’s definition, 
defining the “requirement of force” as “the use of such 
physical force as is sufficient to overcome, restrain, or injure 
a person.”  H. Rep. No. 99-594 at 14 n.54a.  The Government 
relies primarily upon United States v. Lauck, in which the 
Second Circuit quotes only this portion of the House Report’s 
definition.  See Br. for Appellee 17 (quoting Lauck, 905 F.2d 
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at 17).  Specifically, Lauck provides that for the purpose of 
Section 2241(a)(1), “[t]he requirement of force may be 
satisfied by a showing of . . . the use of such physical force as 
is sufficient to overcome, restrain, or injure a person . . . .”  
905 F.2d at 17 (alterations in original) (quoting H. Rep. No. 
99-594 at 14 n.54a); see also United States v. Archdale, 229 
F.3d 861, 868 (9th Cir. 2000) (same); United States v. Fulton, 
987 F.2d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 1993) (same).  We agree with this 
approach and will adopt it for the analysis that follows.12 
 
B 
 
 We turn now to the District Court’s jury instructions 
on the alleged deprivation of civil rights through aggravated 
sexual abuse, 18 U.S.C. § 242.  Where, as here, a party has 
objected to a trial court’s jury instruction, “[w]e exercise 
plenary review in determining ‘whether the jury instructions 
stated the proper legal standard.’”  United States v. 
Khorozian, 333 F.3d 498, 507-08 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation 
omitted).  We review the “wording of instructions for abuse 
of discretion.”  Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Mills, 821 F.3d 448, 
465 (3d Cir. 2016).  “We must reverse if ‘the instruction was 
capable of confusing and thereby misleading the jury.’”  
United States v. Zehrbach, 47 F.3d 1252, 1264 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(en banc); see also United States v. Tykarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 
477 (3d Cir. 2006).  In reviewing the charge, “we consider the 
                                              
 12  We need not reach the first portion of the House 
Report’s definition, providing that for Section 2241(a), “[t]he 
requirement of force may be satisfied by a showing of the 
use, or threatened use, of a weapon.”  H. Rep. No. 99-594 at 
14 n.54a. 
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totality of the instructions and not a particular sentence or 
paragraph in isolation.”  Khorozian, 333 F.3d at 508 (citation 
omitted).   
 
1 
 
 In Shaw’s case, the District Court first instructed the 
jury on the base offense of deprivation of civil rights, 
18 U.S.C. § 242.  As part of this instruction, it charged the 
jury on the alleged deprivation of the right to bodily integrity, 
in relevant part, as follows: 
 
The government alleges that the 
defendant deprived [E.S.] of the 
right to bodily integrity by 
sexually assaulting her.  In 
determining whether the alleged 
conduct of the defendant 
constitutes unwanted sexual 
contact, it is not necessary to find 
that the defendant used physical 
force against [E.S.].  Instead, you 
may consider factors such as the 
context in which the alleged 
incident occurred, the relationship 
between the parties, the relative 
positions of power and authority 
between the defendant and [E.S.], 
the disparity in size between the 
defendant and [E.S.], and the use 
of mental coercion. 
 
App. 803-04 (emphasis added). 
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 The District Court later instructed the jury on the 
aggravated crime of deprivation of civil rights through 
aggravated sexual abuse, 18 U.S.C. § 242.  As part of this 
instruction, the District Court instructed the jury on the 
element of “using force against th[e] other person” under 
Section 2241(a)(1).  Shaw challenges a narrow portion of the 
charge, as follows: 
 
You may find that the defendant’s 
conduct involved aggravated 
sexual abuse if you find that he 
used force during the alleged 
sexual assault. . . . [R]estraint 
alone can constitute sufficient 
force to meet the force 
requirement when a defendant 
employs a degree of restraint 
sufficient to prevent an individual 
from escaping the sexual contact.  
The disparity in coercive power 
and size between the defendant 
and [E.S.] are factors that the 
jury may consider when 
determining whether force was 
utilized. 
 
App. 808-09 (emphasis added). 
 
 On appeal, Shaw challenges only the emphasized 
portion of the charge, in which the District Court instructed 
the jury that disparities in coercive power and size are 
“factors” to consider as to aggravated sexual abuse under 
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Section 2241(a)(1).13  Specifically, Shaw argues that this 
“disparit[ies]” instruction was strikingly similar to the District 
Court’s earlier instruction on unwanted sexual contact.  As 
such, he argues, the jury instructions collapsed the distinction 
between the greater and lesser offenses.  For the reasons 
below, we agree. 
 
 As to the text of the jury instructions, Shaw correctly 
notes that the District Court instructed the jury to consider 
disparities in power and size as “factors” for both a 
deprivation of civil rights and a deprivation of civil rights 
through aggravated sexual abuse.  App. 803, 808.  First, the 
District Court instructed the jury to consider “the disparity in 
size between the defendant and [E.S.], and the use of mental 
coercion” when determining whether there was unwanted 
sexual contact.  App. 803-04.  Second, it instructed the jury to 
consider “[t]he disparity in coercive power and size between 
the defendant and [E.S.] . . . when determining whether force 
was utilized” for aggravated sexual abuse.  App. 808-09.  
These instructions together could have “confus[ed] and 
thereby misle[d]” the jury into believing that non-consent or 
coerced consent was equivalent to the use of force.  
Zehrbach, 47 F.3d at 1264. 
 
 Indeed, the Seventh Circuit recently rejected a similar 
disparities instruction in United States v. Cates, 882 F.3d at 
737.  In Cates, the trial court charged the jury that, for the 
purpose of Section 2241(a)(1), “[f]orce may also be implied 
from a disparity in coercive power or in size between the 
                                              
 13  This opinion should not be read to approve of any 
portion of the jury instructions not challenged on appeal.   
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defendant and [victim].”  Id. (first alteration in original).  On 
appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that this instruction 
“erroneously conflated the distinction between ‘force’ and 
‘fear,’ . . . permitt[ing] the jurors to find that [the defendant] 
committed aggravated sexual abuse based on proof of 
something less than either physical force or a threat of fear of 
death or serious bodily injury.”  Id.  We hold the same is true 
here.   
 
 In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that the 
Tenth Circuit has adopted the opposite position, upholding a 
jury instruction that “[f]orce may also be implied from a 
disparity in coercive power or in size between the defendant 
and the victim or from the disparity in coercive power, 
combined with physical restraint.”  Holly, 488 F.3d at 1301.  
The problem with Holly is that the approved jury instruction 
is unmoored from its foundation. 
 
 The disparities instruction approved in Holly is based 
upon the House Report accompanying the Sexual Abuse Act 
of 1986.  As explained above, the House Report provides that 
the “requirement of force” under Section 2241(a) “may be 
satisfied by . . . the use of such physical force as is sufficient 
to overcome, restrain, or injure a person.”  H. Rep. No. 99-
594 at 14 n.54a (emphasis added).  Applying this definition, 
an early Eighth Circuit decision held that restraint—and 
thereby force—could be proven, at least in part, through 
evidence of size disparities.  See United States v. Bordeaux, 
997 F.2d 419, 421 (8th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. 
Demarrias, 876 F.2d 674, 678 (8th Cir. 1989); Simmons, 470 
F.3d at 1121.  Likewise, at oral argument the Government 
defended the District Court’s disparities instruction on the 
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ground that disparities are relevant to physical restraint.14  
The Holly instruction, however, contained no such link.  Nor 
did the disparities instruction in Shaw’s case.  Instead, the 
District Court’s disparities jury instruction could have misled 
the jury into “conflat[ing]” non-consent or coerced consent 
with actual force, undermining Congress’s graded approach. 
Cates, 882 F.3d at 737. 
 
2 
 
 This does not, however, complete our analysis.  
Rather, we must “consider the totality of the instructions and 
not a particular sentence or paragraph in isolation.”  United 
States v. Sussman, 709 F.3d 155, 175 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation 
omitted).  Read in their totality, the District Court’s jury 
                                              
 14  See Oral Argument at 1:14:53 (“The disparity in 
size and coercive power is certainly relevant as to whether the 
force is sufficient to restrain the victim.”); id. at 1:15:46 (“I’m 
saying physical force sufficient to restrain the victim, and in 
that instance a disparity in size and coercive power is 
certainly relevant to that finding.”).  Conversely, the 
Government disclaimed the position that disparities in 
coercive power without physical restraint amount to the use of 
force under Section 2241(a)(1).  Id. at 1:17:02 (positing that if 
there were physical disparities but no restraint “I don’t know 
that there would be force, unless the victim is testing that she 
is physically unable to escape the sexual contact.”); id. at 
1:25:51 (positing that coerced sexual intercourse based upon 
a correction officer’s threat to revoke inmate’s visitation and 
telephone privileges “would not entail the requisite force to 
bring this to an aggravated sexual abuse”).   
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instructions did not convey to the jury that it could convict 
Shaw of a deprivation of civil rights through aggravated 
sexual abuse without finding actual force.  Therefore, 
considering the charge as a whole, we will affirm.  See United 
States v. McGill, 964 F.2d 222, 236 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 
 Although the District Court’s disparities instruction 
could have misled the jury, other portions of the charge 
adequately distinguished between the lesser and aggravated 
offenses.  See United States v. Berrios, 676 F.3d 118, 138 (3d 
Cir. 2012).  As to the lesser offense, the District Court 
explained to the jury that “it is not necessary to find that the 
defendant used physical force against [E.S.].”  App. 803.  It 
instructed the jury that it could convict based upon “unwanted 
or coerced” sexual contact, App. 803, or a sexual act that was 
“unauthorized and not due to the free and voluntary consent 
of [E.S.],” App. 804.  It instructed the jury to consider 
“whether any such sexual act occurred freely and voluntarily, 
or was the result of official intimidation, harassment, or 
coercion.”  App. 804. 
 
 In contrast, as to the aggravated offense, the District 
Court explained to the jury that Section 2241(a) requires 
either “using force against th[e] other person . . . [o]r . . . 
placing th[e] other person in fear that any person will be 
subjected to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping.”  
App. 807.  Adding clarity, it instructed the jury that Section 
2241(a)(1) requires the jury to find that Shaw “used force 
during the alleged sexual assault,” App. 808, and contains a 
“requirement of force,” App. 808.  
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   Thus, upon consideration of the charge as a whole, the 
instructional error does not warrant overturning the verdict.  
See Mills, 821 F.3d at 467. 
 
C 
 
 Relatedly, Shaw also challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence for a deprivation of civil rights through aggravated 
sexual abuse, 18 U.S.C. § 242.  Our review of the sufficiency 
of the evidence is “highly deferential.”  United States v. 
Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 430 (3d Cir. 2013) (en 
banc).  We ask “whether, after viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of 
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 
307, 318-19 (1979) (emphasis omitted).  For the reasons 
below, we will affirm.15   
 
 As stated above, the crime of aggravated sexual abuse 
occurs where the offender “knowingly causes another person 
to engage in a sexual act—(1) by using force against that 
other person; or (2) by threatening or placing that other 
person in fear that any person will be subjected to death, 
serious bodily injury, or kidnapping; or attempts to do so.”  
18 U.S.C. § 2241(a).  Under Section 2241(a)(1), “[t]he 
requirement of force may be satisfied by a showing of . . . the 
                                              
 15  The parties dispute whether Shaw preserved his 
sufficiency of the evidence claim in the District Court through 
a motion for judgment of acquittal.  We need not resolve this 
dispute because, even assuming arguendo that the issue was 
preserved, the claim fails. 
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use of such physical force as is sufficient to overcome, 
restrain, or injure a person . . . .”  Lauck, 905 F.2d at 17 
(alterations in original) (quoting H. Rep. No. 99-594 at 14 
n.54a). 
 
 Shaw argues that the evidence was insufficient to 
establish that he “us[ed] force against th[e] other person” 
under Section 2241(a)(1).  We disagree.  Viewed in the light 
most favorable to the Government, a rational juror could have 
found that Shaw used actual force when he “forced himself 
on [E.S.],” App. 332, by “[p]ressing down” his hand on E.S.’s 
chest so that she was unable to get up, App. 404, while 
committing the sexual act of digital penetration, and laid on 
E.S. with the weight of his body, while having sexual 
intercourse with her, such that she was unable to move and 
“felt like [she] couldn’t breathe,” App. 404.  Therefore, 
Shaw’s sufficiency of the evidence claim fails.   
 
III 
 
 We now address Shaw’s remaining claims: two 
evidentiary issues and a constitutional speedy trial claim.  
Each lacks merit.    
 
A 
 
 In his first evidentiary claim, Shaw challenges a 
portion of E.S.’s testimony on redirect examination.  
Specifically, the District Court permitted E.S. to testify on 
redirect that she is in therapy in connection with the sexual 
assault.  Shaw objected to this testimony, but the District 
Court overruled the objection on the ground that Shaw 
opened the door on cross-examination in two ways: (1) by 
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asking E.S. whether she had “done reasonably well getting 
[her] life together since this event” and (2) by asking E.S. 
whether she had told school students during a presentation 
that the “worst” part of her experience in jail was a fight.  
App. 369, 375. 
 
 We need not determine whether the District Court 
abused its discretion in allowing E.S. to testify that she is in 
therapy, as any potential error would be harmless.  See United 
States v. Bailey, 840 F.3d 99, 124 (3d Cir. 2016).  “An 
evidentiary error is harmless if ‘it is highly probable that the 
error did not contribute to the judgment,’ which ‘requires that 
the court possess a sure conviction that the error did not 
prejudice the defendant.’”  Id. (quoting Zehrbach, 47 F.3d at 
1265).  Any error in Shaw’s case would be harmless “given 
the truly overwhelming quantity of legitimate evidence” 
against him, including E.S.’s testimony, the DNA evidence, 
the cell door records, and the surveillance videos, and given 
that the Government did not mention this testimony in its 
closing argument.  United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 
571 (3d Cir. 2010).  Thus, this evidentiary claim fails. 
   
B 
 
 In his second evidentiary claim, Shaw argues that the 
District Court admitted lay opinion testimony in violation of 
Federal Rule of Evidence 701(c).  We review this claim for 
abuse of discretion.  See United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 
137, 170 (3d Cir. 2008).   Under Rule 701, lay opinion 
testimony must be “(a) rationally based on the witness’s 
perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s 
testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based 
on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within 
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the scope of Rule 702.”  Fed. R. Evid. 701.  Rule 701(c) 
prohibits a party from “us[ing] Rule 701 as an end-run around 
the reliability requirements of Rule 702 and the disclosure 
requirements of [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16].”  
Hirst v. Inverness Hotel Corp., 544 F.3d 221, 227 (3d Cir. 
2008). 
 
 Citing Rule 701(c), Shaw challenges the District 
Court’s decision to allow an ECCF maintenance information 
technician, Neves, to testify as a lay witness.  Neves testified 
regarding the ECCF surveillance camera clocks, which were 
not synchronized.  Neves used “arithmetic” to synchronize 
the cameras’ time stamps ex post.  App. 153.  His testimony 
was based on subtraction, not “scientific, technical, or other 
specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.”  
Fed. R. Evid. 701(c); see also United States v. Georgiou, 777 
F.3d 125, 144 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that comparing stock 
quantities and prices did not require specialized knowledge).  
Thus, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
admitting Neves’s lay opinion testimony.   
 
C 
 
 Finally, Shaw raises a cursory constitutional speedy 
trial claim.  Where, as here, a defendant fails to raise a Sixth 
Amendment claim in the district court, we review for plain 
error.  See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 
(2002).16   
                                              
 16  The plain error test requires (1) an error; (2) that is 
“clear or obvious” and (3) “affected the defendant’s 
substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he or she 
must ‘show a reasonable probability that, but for the error,’ 
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 In assessing a constitutional speedy trial claim, we 
consider the “[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the 
defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the 
defendant.”  Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).  
“None of these factors is . . . ‘necessary or sufficient’ . . . and 
the factors ‘must be considered together with such other 
circumstances as may be relevant.’”  United States v. Battis, 
589 F.3d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 
533). 
 
 The first factor, the length of the delay, “trigger[s]” the 
speedy trial analysis.  Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 
651 (1992) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31); see also 
Hakeem v. Beyer, 990 F.2d 750, 760 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding 
that “though rigid time limitations have been rejected in 
analyzing the constitutional right to a speedy trial,” a delay of 
fourteen months triggers an analysis of the remaining Barker 
factors).  In Shaw’s case, the Government concedes that a 
delay of twenty-seven months was sufficient to trigger an 
analysis of the remaining Barker factors. 
 
                                                                                                     
the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.”  
Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1343 
(2016) (quoting United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 
74, 76, 82 (2004)).  If these conditions are met, we will 
exercise our discretion to correct the error if it “seriously 
affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.”  Id. (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 
725, 736 (1993)).   
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 But rather than argue the Barker factors, Shaw merely 
contends that prejudice can be presumed from the length of 
the delay.  See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655 (recognizing “that 
excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of 
a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, 
identify”).  However, even assuming arguendo that the delay 
in Shaw’s case was presumptively prejudicial, Doggett 
further provides that “such presumptive prejudice cannot 
alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the 
other Barker criteria.”  Id. at 656; see also United States v. 
Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 1998).  Thus, there is no 
clear error.17 
                                              
 17  Shaw further argues, fleetingly, that that the 
Government failed to disclose a letter written by E.S., and 
that the District Court erred by declining to permit the playing 
of a supposedly corresponding audio recording.  Arguments 
raised in such a cursory fashion, without adequate citation to 
the record and authority, are deemed waived.  See Kost v. 
Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 1993); Fed. R. App. P. 
28(a)(8)(A).  And regardless, both contentions lack merit.  As 
reference to the letter drafted by E.S., Shaw cites the 
Presentence Investigation Report.  That report contains a 
victim impact statement requested by the Probation Office in 
preparation for sentencing.  Nothing in the Presentence 
Report, which is the only record support cited by Shaw, 
suggests that E.S. prepared this statement or provided it to the 
Government prior to entry of the jury verdict.   With respect 
to the audio recording, the record establishes that trial counsel 
initially proposed to play a portion of E.S.’s recorded 
interview, outside the presence of the jury, to refresh her 
recollection.  However, counsel withdrew the request.  As 
such, neither issue presents a basis for relief. 
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IV 
 
 The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed. 
